If all goes to plan, Friedrich Merz will become the Federal Republic‘s 10th chancellor on May 6. The two remaining hurdles appear to be formalities: On Monday, his conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will convene for a special party conference to approve the coalition contract with the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Then, a few days later, the SPD’s members — some grumbling notwithstanding — are expected to approve the alliance in a vote, with the results announced on April 30.
But Merz won’t have long to enjoy the congratulations. Even though he won the national election in late February, the 69-year-old’s personal popularity seems to be on a permanent slide: According to an April poll by research institute Forsa for Stern magazine, just 21% of respondents consider Merz trustworthy — nine percentage points lower than in August, and down three points from January.
The same poll found that only 40% of respondents consider the incoming chancellor a strong leader, and 27% think Merz “knows what moves people,” both of which represent nine-point falls since January. On the plus side — indeed, the only leadership criteria in which Merz scored a majority in the survey — about 60% of respondents believe that Merz “speaks understandably.”
A not-so-grand coalition
It’s no shock that Merz isn’t exactly the most popular chancellor-in-waiting Germany has ever seen. But Ursula Münch, the director of the Tutzing Academy for Political Education in Bavaria, told DW that it’s not all his fault. “The circumstances are very different than they used to be,” Münch said. “We have a government that has a relatively small proportion of support among voters.”
Merz has not picked the most fortunate moment in history: In traditional political parlance, a coalition of the CDU/CSU and SPD is called a “grand coalition,” because for many decades these two parties represented an overwhelming majority of Germany’s voters (sometimes well over 80%). In the fragmented landscape of 2025, in which parties have splintered and splintered again over the past 20 years, the two big centrist parties can only claim to represent 45% of voters, going by the February election results.
Merz’s trust issues
There are two obvious reasons why the perception of Merz’s trustworthiness might have fallen in the past few months. In January, Merz broke his own word when he became the first CDU leader to pass a motion through the Bundestag with the support of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), whole factions of which are deemed by intelligence agencies to be a threat to Germany’s democratic order.
For CDU supporters, however, that seemed like a less-egregious U-turn than the one Merz performed a few weeks later: In March, the party leader agreed a debt brake reform with the SPD and the Greens that paved the way for €1 trillion ($1.14 trillion) in new loans, something he had expressly ruled out throughout the election campaign.
Unsurprisingly, many of his voters felt betrayed. In a “Politbarometer” poll carried out by public broadcaster ZDF at the time, some 73% of Germans agreed that he had deceived voters — including some 44% of CDU/CSU supporters.
Merz’s head-through-the-wall attitude
Merz has problems that go much further back than hisrecent U-turns. Surveys have shown that he is particularly unpopular among women. A Forsa survey from March 2024 found that only 9% of women aged 18 to 29 saw Merz as their preferred chancellor candidate.
The incoming chancellor has been dogged with accusations of misogyny. In 1997, as is often brought up, he was one of the Bundestag members who voted against recognizing rape within marriage as a crime. In October last year, he was criticized for rejecting the idea of gender-balanced Cabinets, and this reputation was not helped by a photo released in February showing that the main negotiators of the CDU/CSU bloc were all middle-aged men.
Merz is also unpopular in eastern Germany, where he regularly polled behind both the AfD’s Alice Weidel and the SPD’s Olaf Scholz in the run-up to the election — partly, it seems, because of his belligerent attitude toward Russia.
Merz’s AfD problem
Merz’s calculation appears to be that, with right-wing populism apparently on rise around the world, what people want is straight-talking leadership. But populism does not appear to be making him more popular. In November 2018, when he first announced his candidacy to re-take the leadership of the CDU, Merz posted a tweet that seems to age worse with every month: “We can once again reach up to 40% and halve the AfD. That is possible!” he wrote. “But we must create the preconditions for it. That is our task.”
Almost the opposite has happened. Since Merz eventually re-took the CDU leadership in January 2022 (on his third attempt), the party’s poll ratings have stayed at 24%, while the AfD’s have not halved but doubled: From 11% to 24%. Germany’s far-right and center-right parties are now neck and neck.
But, of course, Merz has not had a chance to be chancellor yet, and Münch said he might yet be able to make good on his AfD prediction — if his government runs without the internal strife that dogged Scholz’s coalition, and if it is not hit by an external crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic or escalating war in Ukraine that would requires the chancellor to take more U-turns and lose even more trust. Those are big ifs.
“The best way to keep the AfD small isn’t making some random announcement about big changes in refugee policy that you can’t implement,” Münch said. “It’s concrete measures that people also notice. But that’s not something that a new government can just turn around overnight. People need to be given confidence again, and that will only be possible when the economic forecast turns more positive and the refugee numbers fall.”
Merz was initially considered a strong candidate precisely because of his business background (he was on the board at the investment company BlackRock for several years), which was supposed to signal his economic acumen. In the past few years, however, his populist statements have increasingly been about immigration, and that hasn’t helped him shake off the AfD.

German industry under pressure

The story so far:

Following the death of Pope Francis on April 21, the Catholic Church entered into the sede vacante(the time for which the papal seat is empty). This period culminates in the Papal Conclave, the ancient ritual to elect the next Pope. While deeply spiritual, the Conclave is also a political process — a complex interplay shaped by rules, personalities, historical precedents, and the significant, sometimes controversial, legacy of the previous pontificate.

Also Read: Pope Francis | 1936-2025

How does the Conclave work?

The Universi Dominici Gregis (UDG), an apostolic constitution, governs the process. It dictates strict procedures, and demands secrecy and complete isolation within the Vatican City. This enforced secrecy aims to minimise external influence. However, it simultaneously creates a unique internal political environment. Here, influence hinges on pre-existing relationships, sharp negotiation, and the persuasive efforts of respected figures — the ‘great electors’ — working behind the scenes to build alliances and steer votes. Sequestered, cardinal electors are incentivised to make their choice based on their own conscience, free from external lobbying. Also significant is the fact that a successful candidate requires a a two-thirds majority. This necessitates consensus-building, favours compromise and candidates acceptable across different blocs, preventing any narrow faction from dominating.

Only cardinals under 80 years, at the time of the Pope’s death or resignation, have voting rights. However, cardinals over the age-limit can still participate in pre-Conclave general congregations, leveraging their experience and clout, potentially swaying less experienced cardinals before voting even begins. 

The current electorate was significantly shaped by Pope Francis; he appointed approximately 80% (around 108 of the 135 expected attendees) of the voting cardinals. He frequently exceeded the nominal 120-elector limit set by Paul VI — a clear exercise of papal prerogative, allowing a Pope to rapidly influence the body choosing his successor.

What are the major political divisions among electors?

Significant ideological differences mark the College of Cardinals, broadly reflecting the intense debate over Pope Francis’s legacy and the Church’s future path. Broadly there are two major camps — reformist and conservative. The reformist/progressive faction supports Pope Francis’s vision. They emphasise pastoral theology (more practical application) over rigid doctrine, encourage synodality (a more consultative Church), prioritise social justice — poverty, migration, climate change — and favour greater inclusion of women and other marginalised groups such as LGBTQ+ Catholics.

Conversely, the conservative/traditionalist faction has concerns about the perceived doctrinal ambiguity and the departure from tradition during Pope Francis’s pontificate. This faction stresses the need for upholding liturgical tradition (including the restricted pre-Vatican II Latin Mass), clear doctrinal teaching, and seeks a reaffirmation of established moral norms. Some desire a distinct “course correction”.

However, a broad compartmentalisation misses nuance. Such a generalisation is complicated by numerous cardinals, especially appointees from the Global South, who defy easy categorisation. While many of these cardinals hold socially conservative views (evident in the strong resistance by African bishops to Fiducia Supplicans, the document allowing blessings for same-sex couples), they also resonate deeply with Pope Francis’s focus on social justice, poverty, environmentalism, and anti-colonialism. This complex mix makes their voting patterns less predictable. It positions them as a crucial potential ‘swing’ bloc, absolutely necessary for building a two-thirds majority.

How has the geographical balance of power shifted?

Pope Francis deliberately reshaped the College of Cardinals to make it less European and more reflective of the Church’s actual global distribution. He frequently bypassed traditional European power centres and appointed cardinals from the “peripheries” — nations which were never before represented. The result has been profound. Europeans now constitute less than half (approx. 39.3%) of cardinal electors — a first in centuries, dropping significantly from around 51-52% in 2013. While still the largest single regional bloc, with Italy retaining the most electors, Europe’s historical dominance has clearly diminished.

Conversely, other regions have grown: Asia-Pacific accounts for about 17%, Latin America 15.6%, and Africa 13.3%. This globalised composition introduces new political dynamics. Cardinals from the Global South bring perspectives deeply shaped by poverty, migration, interreligious dialogue (especially with Islam), environmental challenges, and the realities of Church growth. Their voices could shift discussions away from solely European concerns. This structural shift increases the plausibility of a non-European Pope and demands cross-regional coalition-building to reach the two-thirds threshold. Latin America, however, remains somewhat underrepresented relative to its large share of the global Catholic population.

What issues will likely dominate the discussions?

The cardinals’ deliberations will inevitably grapple with several pressing issues revealing underlying political and theological tensions. Synodality, perhaps Pope Francis’s defining project, which envisions a Church emphasising listening, dialogue, and shared responsibility, faces a highly contested future. Supporters see it as an essential renewal; critics fear it undermines authority or dilutes doctrine. A candidate’s stance here will be a major indicator.

Navigating contentious social and moral questions also remains a critical challenge. Pope Francis fostered a more pastoral tone regarding LGBTQ+ Catholics, culminating in the controversial Fiducia Supplicans, which faced strong resistance. Balancing pastoral outreach with traditional doctrine is a tightrope the next Pope must walk.

Also Read:Pope Francis funeral | Mighty, meek bid farewell; Francis is remembered as a ‘pope among the people’ in his funeral Mass

The role of women is another key issue. Despite Pope Francis appointing more women to leadership and allowing them Synod votes, calls for greater inclusion persist, including the unresolved question of women deacons. Sensitive topics like clerical celibacy and bioethics also loom. Further, the global clergy abuse crisis continues its devastating impact on the Church’s credibility. Despite reforms like Vos Estis Lux Mundi (norms established by Pope Francis to tackle sexual abuse), criticisms regarding inconsistent enforcement and accountability linger. Cardinals will likely scrutinise candidates’ commitment to transparency, bishop accountability, and survivor support — a fundamental test of leadership.

Finally, the papacy’s role in geopolitics and internal reform is crucial. The next Pope must navigate conflicts (Ukraine, Gaza), global tensions (U.S.-China), and provide moral leadership on climate change and migration. Diplomatic skill is essential, as is handling sensitive agreements like the controversial Vatican-China deal (allowing the Chinese Communist Party to have a say in bishop appointments, and being criticised for compromising religious freedom). Internally, ensuring the continuation of financial reform in the Vatican, especially after the London property scandal trial, and demonstrating commitment to transparency remain key concerns.

Why is the outcome considered unpredictable?

Vatican observers have highlighted that this Conclave will be of an uncertain nature.

As strict secrecy prevents any external observation of the shifting dynamics and intense alliance-building within the Sistine Chapel, one won’t be able to call the result until the white smoke above the Vatican dispels all doubts. The two-thirds majority rule necessitates broad consensus, often pushing cardinals beyond initial preferences, towards candidates capable of uniting disparate factions. Also, the current college’s diverse composition, with many electors unfamiliar with one another due to Pope Francis’s appointments from the peripheries, adds another layer of unpredictability.

The famous saying, “He who enters the Conclave as Pope, leaves it as a cardinal” suggests that there are no front-runners for Saint Peter’s throne. Ultimately, the choice rests on political manoeuvring, individual discernment, and, for believers, the subtle guidance of the Holy Spirit behind the Conclave’s locked doors.

Franciszek Snarski is interning with The Hindu.