If China’s long-term objective is to neutralise India while it prioritises Taiwan, India’s central task is not symmetry but denial—to ensure that any Chinese attempt to constrain India generates costs Beijing cannot localise, manage, or ignore.
China is unlikely to confront India in isolation. Pakistan will almost certainly be used as a proxy to distract Indian attention, tie down forces, and dilute India’s strategic focus. This reality makes incremental reform inadequate. What India requires is a deliberate, phased military transformation after adopting the present on going modernization that strengthens conventional deterrence while accelerating the adoption of disruptive, next-generation technologies.
Emerging systems—AI-enabled autonomous platforms, humanoid or robotic combat units, quantum-enabled warfare, directed-energy weapons, and hypersonic delivery systems—are no longer futuristic concepts. They are becoming integral to China’s military planning. For India to retain its status as a rising power, early adoption of these technologies is essential. Deterrence in the modern era increasingly flows from technological credibility, not numerical parity.
Strategic aim: Denial, not imitation
India’s objective is not to match China platform for platform, but to deny escalation dominance and preserve freedom of action across land, sea, air, cyber, and space domains.
This requires layered deterrence—strategic, operational, and tactical—across multiple theatres. India must also manage its immediate periphery. Pakistan must be engaged simultaneously at the sub-conventional, conventional, and nuclear deterrence levels. At the same time, India must offset China’s alliance advantages by operationalising selective induction and training with advanced Russian systems, while retaining interoperability with Western forces.
Phase I (2026–2028): Stabilisation and denial
The first priority is to remove vulnerabilities that China could exploit early in a crisis.
India must consolidate logistics and supply chains through improved surface and air connectivity, particularly in border regions. Along the Line of Actual Control, surprise and “salami slicing” tactics must be neutralised through an all-weather, real-time surveillance grid, integrating satellites, drones, and space-based sensors into resilient C4I2 networks. Existing agreements with the United States should be leveraged to accelerate this capability.
Permanent forward deployments in Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh must be sustained with hardened infrastructure, dispersed air bases, and integrated air defence to prevent China from achieving local air superiority. On land, India needs a robust counter-riposte capability at both tactical and strategic levels. The raising of the Mountain Strike Corps has significantly strengthened India’s posture in the eastern sector, but doctrinal adaptation must continue—especially to counter drones and emerging robotic or autonomous PLA formations.
At sea, India must maintain a visible and continuous presence at key chokepoints, particularly around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, signalling that maritime escalation is always on the table.
The proposed RELOS arrangement with Russia offers an opportunity to enhance nuclear submarine and surface fleet capabilities through coordinated operations with Russian warships. Simultaneously, India must retain the ability to operate with U.S. naval forces under a parallel doctrine. This would represent a unique strategic configuration—coordinating with two rival naval powers without alliance entrapment. Such contingencies must be exercised and geographically delineated well in advance.
Phase II (2029–2033): Multi-domain deterrence
The second phase shifts deterrence from border management to theatre-level dominance.
Integrated theatre commands must become fully operational, enabling genuine joint planning and execution. Long-range precision strike capabilities—missiles, rockets, artillery, and air-launched systems—must be networked across services to hold adversary assets at risk well beyond the frontline.
In the maritime domain, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should evolve into a forward strike-surveillance complex capable of threatening Chinese sea lines of communication without resorting to formal blockades.
Cyber and space capabilities must graduate from supporting roles to offensive operational tools, integrated directly into war planning and escalation management.
India should also sustain naval deployments across the Indo-Pacific, while preparing for emerging routes and strategic opportunities in the Arctic—particularly in coordination with Russia following the RELOS framework.
Phase III (2033–2035): Escalation control
By the early 2030s, India must prevent China from shaping escalation dynamics on its own terms.
This demands credible escalation control through advanced precision systems, hypersonic-class weapons, a mature force of nuclear-powered attack submarines, and layered missile defence protecting critical national assets. During this phase, U.S. political and military support must translate into tangible deployments and operational coordination, not merely declaratory assurances.
Logistics resilience becomes decisive. Ammunition, spares, fuel, and electronic components must be predominantly indigenous, enabling India to sustain high-intensity operations for 60–90 days without external resupply.
Phase IV (2035–2040): Strategic shaping
In the final phase, India transitions from deterrence to regional strategic shaping.
A capable navy—built around carrier groups, undersea dominance, and networked maritime partnerships—must ensure Indian primacy in the Indian Ocean. Regional security arrangements should create a dense, interconnected environment that complicates Chinese power projection and raises the cost of adventurism.
Nuclear–conventional integration must remain clearly defined, preserving escalation firebreaks while guaranteeing the survivability and credibility of India’s strategic deterrent. Foreign policy must be modulated accordingly to support this posture.
Force structure and budget alignment
This roadmap is achievable within realistic fiscal limits.
India’s defence spending must rise to approximately 3% of GDP, with allocations prioritised for leverage rather than mass. Around 30% should be directed towards air, aerospace, and naval power; roughly 20% each towards land forces and cyber-logistics infrastructure. Such a distribution reflects the demands of multi-domain deterrence.
Managing external relationships
India must deepen selective cooperation with the United States while preserving robust defence ties with Russia. Preventing Russia’s exclusive dependence on China is not sentimentality—it is a strategic necessity.
Pakistan must be addressed across all three conflict levels simultaneously. Equally important is avoiding rigid alliance commitments. India’s strength lies in strategic ambiguity backed by capability, not formal blocs.
Conclusion: Denying freedom of action
US consolidation of the Western Hemisphere may embolden China—but it does not guarantee strategic immunity.
If India remains narrowly border-fixated, China gains room to manoeuvre.
If India builds theatre-wide, multi-domain deterrence, China faces unacceptable uncertainty.
In an era of hardened spheres and returning doctrines, India’s security will be ensured not by declarations alone, but by its ability to impose costs beyond the battlefield China chooses. India’s unique geography—anchored between continental threats and maritime opportunity—provides decisive geopolitical leverage. Used wisely, it can preserve India’s strategic autonomy well into the 21st century.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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