Jaishankar’s visit to China: Focus on multilateral diplomacy

The recent visit of foreign minister Jaishankar to China (13-15 July, 2025) has led to comments from analysts suggesting that bilateral relations are set to improve. Last year in October, following a meeting between PM Modi and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of a summit in Kazan, there were reports that both desired improvement in ties and had asked their officials to explore means towards this end. In the above context, a close examination of the current India-China relations and India’s strategic interests is relevant.

While there are rationales for improving bilateral relations, serious bilateral challenges hinder such a movement. The unpredictable global environment, which is witnessing fundamental changes in strategic equations, makes it imperative for these two nations to normalise relations for mutual benefits and economic growth. Both are neighbours and have deep economic linkages. The bilateral trade has increased significantly in recent years with total trade exceeding US$ 125 billion, notwithstanding India’s efforts to reduce its dependence on China. Jaishankar rightly stated that the world is witnessing more conflicts, competition, coercion, and economic instability, which demand urgent efforts to stabilise the global order, derisk various dimensions and address long-standing challenges that threaten our collective interests.

Although broader geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions suggest that the bilateral ties should be strengthened, certain factors push the two countries in the opposite direction. First, while China desires to keep the boundary issue on the back burner and normalise relations, India perceives that without the resolution of the boundary dispute, which is associated with occasional aggrandisement by the Dragon, normalisation in broader relations is impossible. This issue is linked with China’s expansionist policy, which in turn is linked with Xi’s ‘Chinese Dream’ of expansion at the cost of its neighbours. China has not only occupied parts of Eastern Ladakh, but has expanded its claims to include not only a few areas along the border, but the entire Arunachal Pradesh. Since 2020, the relations between the two countries seriously deteriorated. Frequent face-offs along the Line of Actual Control raise tensions and hinder the diplomatic moves to improve ties.

Second, China continues to use Pakistan as its strategy to keep India under pressure. India faces threats on two fronts that demand higher level of deployment along the two borders. Pakistan’s 81% defence equipment is from China. In addition, China continues to support Pakistan financially. China is also obstructing Pakistan-based terrorists from being designated as global terrorists by the UN. China has an interest in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to have access to the Indian Ocean. Besides, China also hopes to use Pakistan’s influence on East Turkistan Government in Exile (ETGE), which have support of Uyghurs. China also perceives that Pakistan can be used to enhance its influence in Afghanistan. They have invited Afghanistan to join the CPEC.

Third, China considers India a strategic rival in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. India’s participation in the Quad is disliked by China as it sees this group as a mini-alliance against China. China is trying to enhance its influence in India’s periphery, which is called a ‘string of pearls’ aimed at containing India.

Fourth, India is concerned about economic coercion of China. China is using economic tools strategically: delaying rare-earth magnets, fertilisers, and tunnelling machines, adversely impacting India’s EV and infrastructure sectors. Hence, India is trying to diversify supply chains.

Fifth, China is using the Brahmaputra River as a weapon of coercion. It has built huge dams on this river, which adversely affects downstream India’s northeast. Though a data sharing agreement exists with India paying a hefty sum each year, there is no binding treaty, leaving India vulnerable during floods and droughts. In 2018, while it shared data with Bangladesh, it did not share it with India, that resulted in heavy losses in the northeast.

Sixth, China perceives Dalai Lama and Tibet issues as major irritants. China views India as a haven for the Tibetan separatism. It considers the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation as China’s internal matter. It does not wish to give freedom to the Dalai Lama to name his successor.

It is in this backdrop that Jaishankar’s visit has taken place. India is interested in having peace without sacrificing its national interests. India’s efforts to condemn terrorism has yielded satisfactory results. After the US designated ‘The Resistance Front’ as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), China called on regional countries to enhance counter terrorism cooperation to safeguard regional security, without mentioning TRF. While China is unlikely to go against Pakistan’s interests, this can be regarded as a welcome move.

India’s approach is to push the world towards multipolarity, which can enhance its ability to shape the global structure. India effort is to take everybody on board. Jaishankar’s stress was on strengthening SCO to deal with the challenges. He pointed out that the objective of the SCO was to deal with the triple challenges of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” and hoped that all countries will work in this direction in a cooperative mode. India also urged China to avoid “restrictive trade measures” and to remove roadblocks to economic cooperation.

India is leveraging its diplomatic influence to push for a multipolar world order that advances the interests of the Global South. By strengthening institutions like the G-20, BRICS, and the Quad, India is working to promote peace, economic growth, and stability across regions. India’s diplomatic efforts reflect a careful balance of pragmatism and strategic foresight. India recognises the centrality of multilateralism to have peace and economic prosperity. India also hopes that strong multilateral organisations can help reduce bilateral tensions, particularly on tariffs and terrorism. A strong SCO, not dominated by China, can place constraints on the Chinese aggressiveness. The visit was not just about bilateral relations-it was a statement of India’s commitment to shaping a more just and equitable global order. India is demonstrating its pragmatic approach to diplomacy, seeking peace without compromising its national interests. It is up to China to respond positively and help India in stabilising the global structure to usher an era of peace and economic growth.

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