Does Trump’s Greenland plan signal the end of NATO?

Mr. Trump wants to acquire Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark, which is a NATO member. How do we square this with NATO’s foundational pledge?

C. Raja Mohan: I don’t think Mr. Trump has time for niceties — that there is a 77-year-old alliance with a shared commitment. For him, this is the new unilateralism of the U.S. There is no real respect for international law. He is a president who is unbound and unconstrained at home and feels he can do whatever he likes abroad as well. And since the rest of the world depends on the U.S. for so much, barring China, no other major power has challenged his policies. There is some gap between his demand for Greenland and Denmark’s rejection of the demand. In between these extremes, there are ways in which he could get his way and declare a victory, while also saving face for Denmark in some form.

Why does he want to seize Greenland?

T.G. Suresh: Besides Mr. Trump’s well-stated objective that Greenland is an absolute necessity for American security, other factors are often cited, including control over shipping routes and access to minerals in Greenland. The first is the Northern Sea Route, which connects the Atlantic and the Pacific via the Russian-Norwegian frontiers and runs along the Siberian coastline. The second is the Northwest Passage, a long-envisioned sea route running from the Atlantic through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. If influencing shipping routes is the real concern, the question is, why does the U.S. need Greenland at all, since the Northwest Passage runs through Canadian waters and ultimately connects to the Chukchi Sea?

There is already a well-developed political and institutional arrangement governing the Arctic geography. It is therefore not clear why Mr. Trump is focusing specifically on Greenland.

The bedrock of NATO is the U.S.’s security guarantees. If the U.S. itself is threatening to violate the sovereignty of NATO, what message does it send to smaller NATO members which are suspicious about Russia’s actions?

C. Raja Mohan: It sends a troubling message to most members of NATO. This is because they have long lived under the assumption that, whatever happens, the U.S. will remain their most reliable security partner. Despite all the problems over the last eight years, NATO has held together, largely because of the U.S.’s political commitment to European security.

However, over the last decade, especially during Mr. Trump’s first term, this assumption has been questioned. He has openly challenged the relevance of NATO, arguing that the alliance is “ripping off” the U.S. and that European allies are a burden on American security. Still, during his first term, his administration was broader-based, and the traditional foreign policy establishment continued to shape policy.

This time, that constraint no longer exists. The rise of the MAGA (Make America Great Again) movement reflects a world view that sees alliances as largely useless and believes that the U.S. should look after itself. This camp also questions the long-held assumption that the U.S. must act as the gendarme of the global order, or that American leadership is essential for maintaining global security.

That also leads to the conclusion that the U.S.’s interests lie primarily in the western hemisphere, and that Washington must therefore focus on securing its own immediate strategic space. From Mr. Trump’s perspective, gaining control over Greenland appears to be part of a broader effort to assert dominance over that hemisphere. But his position goes even further. He is not merely seeking influence or a security role; he wants sovereign control over Greenland. This is a wake-up call for Europeans.

At the same time, Mr. Trump has shown a willingness to negotiate directly with Russia on the Ukraine war, often without European leaders at the table. For him and his political base, the idea that NATO is a sacred obligation that the U.S. must bear no longer holds. The challenge for Europe, then, is on how to come to terms with this new reality.

With the U.S., Russia, and China all increasing their footprint, how do you view the Arctic’s rising prominence?

T.G. Suresh: Across the world, major powers are competing to secure access to resources because prevailing development models have become increasingly energy-intensive. The Arctic has therefore emerged as a region of growing interest not only for Arctic states, but also non-Arctic ones. Activity is increasing around both shipping routes and energy and resource extraction. Ideally, global discussions on the Arctic should focus on melting ice and environmental consequences. Instead, we are seeing intense competition among major powers to influence or gain access to the region. This raises an important question: what has the U.S. actually done in this regard? Russia has invested in Arctic development for centuries, building extensive port infrastructure along the Arctic coastline and maintaining a large fleet of icebreakers, many of them nuclear-powered. But neither the White House nor major American firms, particularly energy companies, appear willing to make long-term fixed investments. This is why I do not foresee a major disruption of existing Arctic arrangements, which are largely led by Russia in partnership with Denmark, Canada, and other Arctic states.

Russia is watching Mr. Trump’s Greenland ambitions closely. While a U.S. move that weakens NATO would suit Moscow, stronger American presence in the Arctic would mean long-term strategic competition. How do you assess this Russian dilemma?

C. Raja Mohan: Russian is a major power in many ways. It is arguably the most important power in the Arctic Sea. What happens to Russia’s position will depend to a great extent on the nature of the relationship between Russia and the U.S. In fact, in the conversations on Ukraine peace between the U.S. and Russia, one of the key points under discussion has been collaboration in the Arctic. Mr. Trump has repeatedly said that he wants a decent relationship with Russia and that both countries can jointly exploit natural resources. Much therefore depends on whether Russia and the U.S. can reach a deal on Ukraine and move towards a different kind of relationship. If that happens, they could work together in the Arctic. But if they do not, and Mr. Trump simply gains control over Greenland, then the contest between the two is likely to be quite vigorous.

From oil in Venezuela to rare earths in Greenland, is the U.S. turning to force and coercion as a tool for resource extraction?

T.G. Suresh: Mr. Trump shows a preference for an economical approach to solving problems. Even when he talks about places like Venezuela, there is a visible aversion to putting boots on the ground or taking risks that come with major, disruptive interventions. Two things stand out clearly. First, his personal approach: he wants quick outcomes, what he calls a “deal”, achieved in an economical time frame. Second, even if the U.S. were to attempt to control or establish sovereign ownership over Greenland, it would be extremely difficult. History shows that in regions stretching from the North Atlantic to the coldest parts of the Arctic, it is very hard to override the will of the people. Mr. Trump’s economical, deal-oriented approach is likely to remain the final determining factor.

As Europe boosts defence spending amid the Ukraine war and its ongoing reliance on the U.S., Mr. Trump appears to be distancing America from NATO. How do you assess this?

C. Raja Mohan: This is like a situation where your protector becomes your tormentor. Mr. Trump’s threat of leaving NATO and its potential consequences has made Europe nervous. Faced with what they see as grave existential risks, they are willing to please and accommodate Mr. Trump. This also explains Europe’s approach to the Greenland issue: most of its leaders would prefer to persuade Denmark to find a way out that allows Mr. Trump to gain control over Greenland, while at the same time urging the U.S. to leave Denmark a fig leaf — something that avoids an outcome that appears overtly humiliating.

Can NATO survive Mr. Trump’s second term?

C. Raja Mohan: No. That is precisely why European leaders want to keep the Americans in. The U.S. is needed not only because of its military capabilities, but also because Europe has had the luxury of neglecting its own defence for decades. Even if European governments now follow through on their promises to spend massively on defence, it will take time. Also, Europe’s own history shows that it is internally divided. Without the U.S., there is a real danger that these divisions will sharpen further.

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