The Election Commission of India (ECI)’s renewed push to link Aadhaar with voter ID endangers the right to vote. It is being justified as a measure to clean electoral rolls, eliminate bogus voters, and improve electoral integrity. Yet, experience and data show that Aadhaar linkage has resulted in mass disenfranchisement, systemic errors, exclusions, arbitrary welfare disentitlements, and far-reaching infringements on the fundamental right to privacy of citizens.
Questionable claims
The claim that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is voluntary is questionable. Presently, Form 6B offers no meaningful opt-out — voters must either submit their Aadhaar number or declare they do not have one, coercing even those unwilling to share it into compliance. Unsurprisingly, by September 2023, over 66 crore Aadhaar numbers had already been seeded. This was enabled not only by a coercive legal framework but also by data-sharing practices of questionable legality and constitutional, ethical propriety. These included the use of the DBT Seeding Data Viewer, which permits third-party access to non-biometric identity data held by UIDAI, as well as the repurposing of data collected for the National Population Register and by other government departments for unrelated administrative purposes.
The ECI’s latest proposal fails to rectify this position. On the contrary, it makes the process more restrictive by requiring citizen-voters who do not provide Aadhaar to physically appear before an Electoral Registration Officer to justify their decision. In 2023, in G. Niranjan v. Election Commission of India, the ECI had assured the Supreme Court that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is not mandatory and that appropriate clarifications would be introduced for that purpose; its latest proposal walks back on this commitment.
The new proposal also erodes the commitment to universal and equal suffrage by imposing barriers on those unwilling or unable to furnish Aadhaar. It places a disproportionate burden on the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and individuals in remote areas for whom attending an in-person hearing before the Electoral Registration Officer is often neither practical nor reasonable. This not only compromises individual dignity but also diminishes the trust that is foundational to democratic participation.
The problem is further exacerbated by the lack of a clear, accessible, and time-bound appellate mechanism for the citizen-voter, if their justification for not submitting Aadhaar is arbitrarily rejected. The Supreme Court, in Lal Babu Hussein and Others v. Electoral Registration Officer (1995), unequivocally held that any decision to delete a name from the electoral roll must comply with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.
The Union government and the ECI argue that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage will eliminate duplicate voters and electoral fraud. However, this claim does not withstand scrutiny. Aadhaar was never designed to serve as proof of citizenship. Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, explicitly states that Aadhaar is a residency-based identification system, which means that an Aadhaar holder may not necessarily be an Indian citizen. Multiple High Courts have ruled that Aadhaar is not proof of Indian citizenship. The UIDAI itself has affirmed that even non-citizens residing in India for 182 days are eligible for Aadhaar. Importantly, the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2018) had limited the use of Aadhaar for welfare programmes paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India per Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016.
By linking Aadhaar with the voter ID, the ECI is creating a mechanism that introduces an unreliable filter into the electoral process, risks mass disenfranchisement of citizen-voters, and eroding the sanctity of universal suffrage and democratic participation guaranteed by the Constitution. These dangers are not hypothetical; they have been documented. In 2015, the ECI attempted a similar Aadhaar-voter ID linkage under the National Electoral Roll Purification and Authentication Programme. As a result, in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh alone, 55 lakh voters were arbitrarily removed from electoral rolls due to Aadhaar mismatches. Voters discovered their names missing only when they arrived at polling stations on election day. The ECI was forced to abandon the exercise after the Supreme Court issued a stay through its August 11, 2015 order.
Aadhaar-voter ID linkage also poses a severe risk of dragnet surveillance and voter profiling. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, contains sweeping exemptions for government entities, raising the possibility that voter data could be accessed and exploited for political purposes. Once Aadhaar is linked to voter IDs, it becomes possible to cross-reference electoral data with other databases, allowing ruling parties to monitor voter demographics. The implications are concerning. Political actors could use this data to micro-target voters, suppress opposition strongholds, or even manipulate electoral rolls to achieve predetermined electoral outcomes.
Seeding Aadhaar with electoral roll data subverts core principles of constitutional design. The ECI, vested with the powers of “superintendence, direction and control” over elections, is a constitutionally independent authority. In contrast, the UIDAI is a statutory body operating under executive control — bound by government directives under Section 50 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and subject to supersession under Section 48. Entrusting it with electoral data undermines the separation of powers, jeopardising the integrity of the electoral process and the democratic ideal of free and fair polls.
A further defect lies in the inherent unreliability of the Aadhaar database. The 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Performance Audit Report No. 24 of 2021 identified major deficiencies, including the cancellation of over 4.75 lakh Aadhaar numbers due to their duplication and issuance based on faulty biometric data. The CAG also found no assurance that all Aadhaar holders qualify as ‘residents’ under the Aadhaar Act, as UIDAI had not prescribed any specific proof, document, or process to verify an applicant’s period of residence in India. Relying on such an error-prone database for de-duplicating the electoral rolls would lead to wrongful deletions and exclusions.
Methods of electoral verification
Instead of pushing a technological fix and infringing on the right to privacy of citizens, the ECI must focus on strengthening traditional, time-tested methods of voter verification. Regular door-to-door verification by booth level officers; comprehensive, independent audits of electoral rolls; and functional public grievance redressal frameworks are more effective and constitutionally sound approaches to addressing concerns about alleged duplicate or fraudulent entries. Introducing independent oversight through social audits would further enhance accountability and prevent politically motivated manipulations of electoral rolls.
The right to vote is a constitutional guarantee. Any policy that imposes unreasonable burdens on citizen-voters, introduces unreliable verification mechanisms, or enables political profiling must be abandoned. The Aadhaar-voter ID linkage does all three. That such a constitutionally fraught scheme has found support across the political spectrum is troubling.
John Simte, Lawyer and legal researcher
Published – April 23, 2025 12:58 am IST
