The US National Security strategy 2026: Talks of Western hemisphere but is silent on Eastern hemisphere.
The renewed assertion of American primacy in the Western Hemisphere—evident in strong operational signaling toward Venezuela and renewed strategic interest in Greenland—marks a decisive return to sphere-of-influence geopolitics. Long considered a relic of the 19th century, the Monroe Doctrine has re-emerged in modern form: the United States will tolerate no rival great-power military intrusion in its near abroad.
This development is not merely regional. It has systemic implications for global power distribution, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where China’s rise intersects with India’s security and strategic autonomy. The central question is whether US consolidation in the Western Hemisphere creates permissive conditions for China to act more boldly elsewhere—and whether that, in turn, risks giving Beijing greater freedom of action against India.
American consolidation and strategic bandwidth
By enforcing near-absolute dominance in the Americas, the US achieves two objectives. First, it secures its home hemisphere against external challenge. Second, it frees strategic bandwidth by eliminating uncertainty close to home. However, this does not mean unlimited US engagement elsewhere. On the contrary, it encourages prioritisation.
Washington’s clear priority remains the Indo-Pacific, with Taiwan as the central flashpoint. Yet even here, US strategy increasingly relies on partners rather than unilateral dominance. The implication for other theatres—including the India–China frontier—is that American involvement may be selective, delayed, or indirect.
This perception matters greatly to Beijing. Does it indirectly encourage Beijing for a green signal in Asia? Therefore, what needs a debate here, is the position of India vis-à-vis China’s growing claims in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
China’s strategic reading: Sequencing, not recklessness
China is unlikely to interpret US actions as weakness. Instead, it sees prioritisation. Beijing understands that the US cannot escalate simultaneously in Taiwan, Ukraine, the Middle East, Iran and South Asia without risking strategic overstretch. China’s likely response is sequencing in which primary theatre could be Taiwan followed by secondary stabilisation and countering the Iran flare up and US declared likely occupation of Greenland and Eurasian affairs. There could be, also a constant peripheral pressure on India. The goal is not to defeat India militarily but to ensure India remains strategically fixed—unable or unwilling to interfere in a Taiwan contingency and even reluctantly intervene in the Indo-Pacific theatre.
Does this give China a green signal against India?
The short answer is no—but it creates a dangerous grey zone.
China does not seek a large-scale war with India under current conditions. Instead, it prefers:
- Persistent pressure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
- Infrastructure-led coercion
- Military signaling below the threshold of war
- Continued strategic support to Pakistan
This approach aims to neutralise India strategically, not destroy it militarily. A “free run” would exist only if India remains reactive, border-fixated, and dependent on a single external partner.
India’s strategic position: Between the US and Russia
India’s security posture is unique. On one hand, India’s defence partnership with the US has deepened considerably—encompassing intelligence sharing, logistics support, and interoperability. These arrangements improve India’s situational awareness, particularly along the LAC and in the Indian Ocean.
On the other hand, India’s long-standing military relationship with Russia remains indispensable. Russia continues to supply strategic platforms, provide technology transfer, and offer operational familiarity that cannot be easily replaced by Western sources.
This dual alignment prevents a China–Russia military condominium and preserves India’s strategic autonomy. Ironically, it also complicates Chinese planning: Beijing cannot be certain that Moscow would fully support a coercive move against India.
The military balance: Numbers vs geometry
A comparison of military forces shows clear Chinese numerical advantages—larger defence budgets, a bigger navy, more combat aircraft, and greater industrial capacity. Yet numbers alone do not determine outcomes.
India’s advantages lie in:
- High-altitude operational experience disallows them any major offensive.
- Interior lines in the Himalayas have been vastly improved. The forward air base near at Nyoma(13,000 feet) now allows Rafale and SU30MK1 Fighter Aircrafts have been augmented giving aerial fighter, logistics(C-130J) and troops support at short notice.
- Dominance of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has occurred over last few years. India’s counter remains the US-Naval exercises and the signing of the RELOS with Russia, which gives India access to Russia’s stealth submarines and the routes to Arctic region.
- Political legitimacy as a resident power since last 70 years. In fact, even Tibet is actually disputed but for states agreeing to this for geopolitical advantages.
China’s vulnerabilities include:
- Extended supply lines coming from within China. A total distance of about 1300 Kms from the interiors is a great strain for PLA logistics.
- Maritime energy dependence, where India dominates and especially the bottlenecks like the Malacca Strait.
- Exposure of sea lanes in the Indian Ocean as Indian ships and submarines are very close to the Indian mainland.
Thus, the India–China military balance is less about parity and more about strategic geometry.
The real risk: Strategic marginalisation
The true danger for India is not invasion but marginalisation—being reduced to a defensive actor whose responses are predictable and geographically confined. If China succeeds in keeping India tied down along the LAC while it pursues objectives in Taiwan and the Western Pacific, India’s strategic weight diminishes. Preventing this outcome requires a shift in India’s military thinking.
From border defence to theatre deterrence
The return of doctrine-driven geopolitics—symbolised by the Monroe Doctrine’s revival—signals a harsher international environment. In such a world, autonomy belongs to those who can deny others freedom of action. For India, this means moving beyond a narrow focus on border defence toward theatre-wide deterrence, encompassing land, sea, air, cyber, and space.
This transition is the subject of Part II being published as a follow up.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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