Don’t turn a blind eye to the Russian threat at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, occupied by Russian forces since 2022, is the largest nuclear power facility in Europe. Located in southeastern Ukraine, it once produced enough electricity to power a country the size of Portugal.

Before the full-scale invasion, Zaporizhzhia NPP was a cornerstone of Ukraine’s energy grid. Since its occupation, however, it has become a focal point of international concern.

Recent reporting by Greenpeace and the New York Times presents the clearest evidence to date of Russia’s dangerous intent to restart the power plant to supply electricity to occupied territories, cementing its unlawful gains in southern Ukraine.

For over a year, Russian officials have spoken of their plans to restart the power facility. In February this year, Alexey Likhachev, head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, declared that Russia would do so as soon as “military and political conditions allow it”. Yet, similarly to the initial days of the invasion in 2022, the concrete proof of Russian intentions lies on the ground: the satellite imagery indicates that Russia has built nearly 80 km (50 miles) of power lines, connecting the power plant to the occupied Ukrainian cities of Mariupol and Berdyansk.

Russian plans to restart the power plant are deeply troubling on many levels.

The occupation of an active nuclear power plant in March 2022 is itself unprecedented. This also represents the first time in history that an active frontline lies so close to a functioning nuclear facility, let alone one of this size.

This poses multiple logistical challenges for maintaining the safety of the power plant, which requires a constant source of energy to cool the equipment, even in its current state of cold shutdown. With the US-led peace process showing no concrete signs of a ceasefire emerging, there is little evidence that active fighting will subside or that the risks will diminish in the foreseeable future.

Crucially, the Russian track record on infrastructure safety speaks for itself. In June 2023, Russia destroyed the Kakhovka dam, causing large-scale flooding of 600 sq km and $11bn worth of environmental damage.

At the time, nearly one million people lost access to drinking water, and the ecosystem of southern Ukraine has been permanently altered. Importantly, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is licensed to operate only with water supplied from the Kakhovka reservoir—any alternative sources are not covered by its original operating licence. With the reservoir now destroyed, plans to restart the plant become even more hazardous. The construction of pump stations and wells do not compensate for the legally mandated cooling supply. Without the licensed reservoir, there is currently no compliant, safe, or reliable water source to cool the reactors and spent fuel—meaning a restart under these conditions would violate both safety protocols and legal licensing.

Most importantly, the safe operation of the Zaporizhzhia power plant depends on its engineers. In 2022, Russia brought in Rosatom employees to the facility; however, their presence did not address the core issue, which is the irreplaceability of highly trained, site‑specific engineers—Ukrainian staff uniquely familiar with the plant’s complex systems—who were then subjected to abduction, torture and coercion to sign the contracts with Rosatom.

More than 200 staff have been targeted, raising concern about their capacity to safely operate critical equipment amid a climate of torture and intimidation. It is unclear if enough experienced staff remain, as many, including the director general Ihor Murashov, preferred to flee to unoccupied Ukraine rather than sign contracts with Rosatom.

All of the above raises grave concerns regarding the risk of accidents should the power plant be brought back into active use. The impact of a potential nuclear accident would undoubtedly cross borders.

Rosatom’s official position is that “nuclear energy should remain outside of politics”. Yet, the international community should take no comfort in Russia’s reassurances. As Rosatom’s record in Ukraine shows, it is naive to believe that a de-politicised nuclear agency may exist in a deeply authoritarian state like Russia.

The situation may also be of particular interest to India, especially in light of its regional role and long-standing engagement on nuclear issues. Russia has made India its primary global partner in civilian nuclear projects: six VVER‑1000 reactors are either operational or under construction at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, and New Delhi continues to expand cooperation across the nuclear fuel cycle. While India drives forward with ambitions to triple nuclear capacity by 2031, its reliance on Russian technology underscores a critical dilemma. India, a leading voice in global nuclear governance, must carefully consider the implications of Russian assistance in its nuclear sector. Continued dependence may inadvertently reinforce Moscow’s broader geopolitical entrenchment, while undermining global nuclear liability norms.

India must wean itself off dependency on Russia in nuclear energy by diversifying its partnerships and instead exert pressure on Russia and Rosatom to prevent the restart of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant before a serious accident occurs. By joining IAEA-led calls for a demilitarised nuclear safety protection zone at Zaporizhzhia, India can help share an era where nuclear energy is not weaponised – not just domestically, but globally.

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