Chill gives way to thaw but India, China must go beyond piecemeal fixes

The signals from Beijing and Delhi are unmistakable. The India-China relationship is being stabilised and rebuilt after it literally fell off the Himalayan cliffs in 2020. While the impetus is a predatory US, Modi and Xi Jinping had cleared the decks during their Kazan summit last October.

The collapse of the relationship was the result of many forces of history playing out simultaneously — a dramatic powershift from a US-centred unipolar order to a more plural multipolar world; the intense struggle between the US and Eurasian great powers to shape this changing balance of power; and the spillover effect of that tumultuous geopolitics on India-China relations.

For India, the central dilemma of China policy during this period of flux has been whether to pursue a strategy of audacity or one of prudence. ‘Always more audacity,’ Winston Churchill is quoted as saying, but a state can choose one of these options but not both at the same time. India has oscillated between the two impulses, resulting in a precarious geopolitical situation over the past decade.

The regional setting is now more complicated than ever: a highly militarised northern frontier, China-Pakistan military cooperation that has transformed in ways that could tip the geostrategic balance, and if this was not enough, the US has worked to undermine Indian authority in the subcontinent and exploit it during moments of geopolitical vulnerability. If this were a momentary storm destined to pass, then simply riding out this phase might suffice as a strategy. But the unprecedented economic, technological and military transformations underway will not allow the old world order to restore itself. This is the moment to regain lost initiative and arrest the geopolitical risks that could unravel India’s rising power.

Is there a way to craft a China policy that can shape a more favourable strategic environment?

History offers lessons. Adversarial states have in the past, after bouts of fierce competition and conflict, chosen prudence over rivalry: US-China normalisation in the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 1980s. In both cases, bold policy choices that were domestically unappealing reset relations.

Do those conditions exist in India-China relations today? There is no compelling external force or factor that can drive these two states to bury the hatchet; at least not yet. While both benefit from multipolarity, in practice, Indian and Chinese international visions are still too insular and underdeveloped to enable a shared discourse on world order. Most crucially, the material asymmetry — even after factoring in India’s limited external balancing options — greatly complicates any quest for a grand bargain with major give and take between India and China.

There is no Nixon-like moment around the corner, nor a Deng Xiaoping sort of statesman waiting in the wings in the Indian political scene to redefine the national line as part of a new world order vision. Remember Deng chose a strategy of prudence over audacity and then ensured its political continuity for over three decades despite many twists and turns along the way.

So, what we are left with instead is attempting normalisation but without an overarching vision. As the China policy debate unfolds, there are three central themes that stand out.

First, India’s undeclared goal to be a pillar of a US-led collective security system in Asia is no longer viable. The reasons are obvious — US hegemony has collapsed, India lacks the surplus material strength to underwrite security commitments beyond the subcontinent, and integrating into US-led alliances implies a major loss of sovereignty and geopolitical control. The West is not interested in India’s opinion on how their alliance system should be reformed or redesigned to accommodate an independent India.

Second, the post-neoliberal globalisation chapter for economic interdependence is still being written. While the major economies will be its main authors, India still holds many cards. With competitive advantages of market scalability, human capital and industrial infrastructure, India can negotiate a mutually advantageous economic relationship with China. The door needs to open wider, not in a piecemeal tactical way but with a broad blueprint. If done properly, multilateral aspects like BRICS can also be steered in more concrete ways that benefit India and the region.

Third, despite their differences, both India and China have a vital interest in geopolitical peace on their overlapping peripheries. A typical grand bargain may not be possible, but a degree of convergence can be built based on the mutual recognition that India and China have distinct policy priorities and geopolitical roles. In other words, they can give each other some room to focus on their respective geopolitical and socio-economic priorities. This could be the starting point for the next leadership conversation.

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