The Indian Army today presents a striking paradox. At the tactical edge, it is moving faster than at any point since the post-Kargil reforms—experimenting, restructuring, and embracing drones, data and decentralised lethality. A major force restructuring, a new rocket brigade and a northern truce— led by Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, is good on restructuring, new formation, and drones.
Yet at the strategic-industrial core of its big platforms, it remains shackled to indecision, weight charts and firepower matrices that have turned marquee programmes like Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) and Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) into generational delays. Not that it is easy to direct that, as ultimately it is to be designed and developed by the industry. Despite the repetitive resolve at each, the complexity and evolving matrix of weight, tonnage, engine and firepower over the years, the military must ask the question to either take it or leave it, or raise it.
The result is a force that is around its structures rather than fixing it.
Force modernisation: The sharp end of change
The creation of Bhairav Light Commando Battalions and Rudra Brigades marks the Army’s most radical doctrinal shift in decades. These are not cosmetic renamings; they are structural responses to a battlefield transformed by drones, sensors and precision fires.
On 13 January, Chief of Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi outlined a major restructuring, said: “We have re-oriented and created several new structures: Rudra Brigades (AAB) for high-tempo multi-domain ops and Bhairav Battalions for agility and disruptive effect. Similarly, Shaktibaan Regiments and Divyastra Batteries of artillery will use UAS/C-UAS for extended reach and real-time targeting. Ashni Platoons and other organisations on the design board will enhance precision, surveillance and strike options at the tactical level.
He then shows his approach, and that is indeed a radical change in decision-making and implementing it in such a short time.
So the massive restructuring continues under Gen Dwivedi’s command: “A large number of Govt Sanction Letters (31) for organisational changes have been approved over the past 14–15 months, including pathbreaking IBGisation of 17 Corps and raising of aviation brigades.”
Bhairav units are designed as high-tempo, drone-centric assault formations—lean, lethal, and tech-saturated. Drawn from infantry, mechanised and artillery talent pools, they are optimised for rapid cross-border or counter-intrusion operations, persistent ISR using mini- and nano-drones and loitering munitions for precision strike.
Additionally, the formation is about integrated counter-drone and electronic warfare suites, Networked command enabling mission command at platoon and section level.
Here, the roadmap is progressive: replace brute-force assaults with information dominance + precision attacks. Training standards reflect this shift. Bhairav personnel are being pushed through Drone piloting and swarm-management modules, AI-enabled target acquisition and battle management systems, EW fundamentals, spectrum awareness and counter-UAS drills.
In contrast, Rudra Brigades represent the Army’s answer to multi-domain conventional warfare. These are integrated all-arms formations—infantry, armour, artillery, engineers, air defence and drones—designed to fight as a single sensor-shooter grid. The emphasis is on drone-led surveillance feeding artillery and armour in real time, precision targeting over massed firepower, Faster OODA loops to offset adversary numerical advantages and Seamless integration of loitering munitions, ATGMs and long-range fires
Immediate focus is on innovative kitting of legacy platforms. The next phase involves developing new systems and finally culminating in network-enabled multi-domain operations, the Army Chief said.
Chief also projected the specific upgrade and advancement in the pipeline for Advanced EW systems, BrahMos, Pinaka ELGR systems, Pralay missiles, QRSAM with extended range, loiter munitions, and drones/UCAVs are among the game-changing equipment.”
One key area which has seen speedier indigenisation in Ammunitions, 159 out of 175 categories have been fully indigenised—over 90%. And another is the realisation of “rocket-cum-missile force” and its positioning. The all-pervasive essence of firepower “It may see a different look in terms of size, scope and command and control in future.” Currently, the Corps of Army Air Defence (AAD) and the Artillery regiments are largely responsible for the rockets and missiles in the Army.
The big iron problem: FRCV and FICV
And yet, beneath this tactical and strategically smart restructuring lies a strategic delay over the big platforms which are in the pipeline for two decades.
The Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) and Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) programmes are case studies in how not to modernise a mechanised force.
The FICV story began in the late 2000s when the Mechanised Infantry Directorate sought to replace ageing BMP-2s. The projected cost—about ₹26,000 crore—was ambitious but realistic. Induction was planned by 2022. What followed instead was a cycle of ambition without resolution.
By 2012, the programme was withdrawn in favour of upgrading existing BMPs—an admission that industrial readiness, not operational necessity, was driving decisions. Since then, requirements have grown, but clarity has shrunk.
The Army now wants an FICV that carries loitering munitions and mini-drones, operates across eastern jungles, central plains and northern high-altitude terrain, mounts a 30 mm main gun with ATGMs, transports three crew plus dismounts, and survives modern AT threats while remaining air-transportable
Each requirement is logical. Together, they have become paralysing.
Weight spirals, engine inadequacies, protection vs mobility trade-offs, and disputes over indigenous powerpacks have frozen progress. The same pattern haunts FRCV, where replacing T-72s has turned into an endless debate over tonnage, gun calibre, active protection systems, and engine localisation.
The strategic risk
The danger is not merely obsolescence—it is doctrinal incoherence.
Bhairav units and Rudra Brigades assume speed, protection and digital integration at every echelon. But mechanised infantry still rides platforms designed for Cold War battlefields. Tanks expected to fight drone-saturated environments remain stuck in legacy survivability paradigms. Tactical innovation is racing ahead of platform modernisation, creating a widening capability gap.
In a future conflict, the Army risks having Drone-savvy infantry paired with vulnerable IFVs and networked artillery supporting armour that cannot survive top-attack munitions
The Army and MoD must accept a hard truth: perfect platforms are the enemy of timely capability.
Instead of chasing a single, over-specified FICV or FRCV, India needs: Incremental induction with block upgrades. While it is important to clear weight and engine ceilings aligned with Indian terrain, not brochures, it could embark on mission-focused variants rather than one-size-fits-all designs.
The same urgency must now be imposed on big-ticket platforms, whether on parallel indigenous and licensed-production tracks. Otherwise, India will field 21st-century soldiers riding 20th-century machines into a battlefield that has already moved on.
The edge is sharp. The core must catch up.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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